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The area that has become known, in recent years, as 
the ‘Chinese wholesalers area’ (quartier des grossistes 
chinois) lies just north of Paris, across the Boulevard 
Périphérique, in the southwestern part of the town of 
Aubervilliers. Concentrated around just a few streets and 
crowded together within large former warehouses and 
newly-built commercial centres, row upon row of almost 
identical showrooms display manufactured products 
imported from China to be sold wholesale – mainly shoes 
and clothing, but also cheap watches and jewellery, and all 
kinds of curios. 
Since the early 1990s, several hundreds of Chinese 
wholesalers (currently estimated at over 700) have set 
up their businesses there. The wholesalers are not recent 
immigrants. They live in other, better-off suburban areas 
further out in the northern banlieue (suburb) rather than 
in the nearby immigrant neighbourhoods of Aubervilliers. 
They arrived in the 1970s and 1980s, in many cases to join 
family who had arrived previously or to take over busi-
nesses from uncles or fathers who had returned to China.1 
I estimate that about half of the wholesalers are the sons 
and daughters of immigrants; their parents helped them to 
start up businesses in Aubervilliers. Those who were born 
in France, and many of those who joined their parents at a 
young age, are French nationals. 
Many moved their family-run shops from inner Paris 
to this suburb as a result of municipal policies aimed 
at reducing the number of wholesalers in the capital. 
Aubervilliers is one of the poorest towns in one of the 
poorest departments in France, Seine-Saint-Denis. The 
presence of the Chinese wholesale business is a source of 
income for the town, and even if they would like to limit 
its geographic expansion, the municipal authorities do not 
have the financial means to do so.2 The authorities have 
acted pragmatically towards the Chinese, by branding 
Aubervilliers as the ideal port of entry for Chinese capital 
in a typical instance of the creation of ‘monopoly rent’ 
(Harvey 2001). They have co-opted leading Chinese entre-
preneurs in their pursuit of the ‘urban growth machine’ 
(Molotch 1976). 
A few entrepreneurs, often both wholesalers and real 
estate subcontractors, have become the main negotiators 
in dealing with the municipal authorities. Among them, the 
most important and successful businessman is Mr Wang. 
He was born in 1965 and arrived in the early 1970s to 
join his parents. He started in the import and wholesale 
business, but these have now become minor activities 
in comparison to his investments in real estate. He rents 
space from the formerly state-owned, recently privatized 
company ICADE, that owns the former warehouses, and 
sublets these to more than 300 wholesalers. He and his 
fellow entrepreneurs act as lobbyists to influence munic-
ipal policy and they regularly participate in meetings 
with the local authorities on matters relating to Chinese 
wholesalers.3
Over the past two years, the Chinese wholesalers in 
Aubervilliers have called for a strengthening of the police 
force and protection from the violent robberies they suffer. 
Yet, they have been urged by the public authorities to take 
steps to secure their own protection. One such measure 
was to install surveillance cameras to film people on the 
streets. However, this does not comply with French legis-
lation on camera surveillance.4 Knowing this, why have 
surveillance cameras been adopted as a solution? 
This question guides the ethnographic analysis pre-
sented here of a situation where the installation of surveil-
lance cameras was locally negotiated by the main actors 
involved – namely, the wholesalers’ representatives and 
the police. However, the choice of surveillance cameras 
was not made in a context free of constraints, since there 
are legal limits set on surveillance at a national level. 
Moreover, the use of surveillance cameras in specific 
neighbourhoods was the object of a debate within the 
Aubervilliers municipal government, and the question had 
not yet been settled at the time the wholesalers decided to 
install their own. 
In the wholesalers’ case, it was the one solution eve-
ryone tacitly agreed upon, in spite of the limitations and in 
the absence of any other solutions. In what follows I will 
show that this choice appeared optimal in the sense that 
both parties reached a tacit agreement that, considering 
the lack of other options, surveillance cameras were the 
best solution for the time being. The reason why this solu-
tion was optimal (but not ideal) may be revealed through 
an examination of the particular pattern of interaction 
between the wholesalers and the police and local authori-
ties. Here, I make use of Gregory Bateson’s notion of the 
‘double bind’ (2000) to consider the contradictory mes-
sages that the Chinese wholesalers and the police sent one 
another. 5
I will begin by showing how the Aubervilliers whole-
salers publicized the problem they were facing. Thereafter 
I will analyze the interaction between the wholesalers and 
the police and examine why security cameras seemed to 
be the optimal solution to this situation. Finally I will 
show how, in the course of this interactional process, the 
border between private and public became an object of 
negotiation and reinterpretation. This led to an unsatisfac-
tory solution that amounts to a de facto privatization of 
surveillance.
The formation of UCAS and publicization of the 
‘security’ issue
In early 2011, the formation of UCAS (Union des commer-
çants Chinois d’Aubervilliers pour la sécurité, Huashang 
zhian lianmeng, or ‘Chinese merchants league for public 
security’) was announced on the internet forum Huarenjie 
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Fig. 1. Location of 
Aubervilliers in relation 
to Paris.
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Fig. 2. Portrait of Mr Wang 
in the magazine megalopolis: 
‘Will he buy Paris?’.
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1. Almost all originate 
from the area around the 
city of Wenzhou, Zhejiang 
province, in China and speak 
the Wenzhou dialect. The 
history of Wenzhou migration 
in France goes back to the 
end of the 19th century and 
the Wenzhou form the largest 
group among the Chinese in 
the Paris region. 
2. I collected this 
information during field 
research conducted in 
Aubervilliers between 
November 2010 and June 
2012, and in the course of 
interviews with the mayor and 
several political actors at the 
town level and above. 
3. Part of the field 
research carried out has been 
conducted in collaboration 
with sociologist Chuang 
Ya-han who is working 
on a larger project on 
the Chinese in Paris. We 
attended meetings and 
conducted interviews either 
separately or together 
during the whole period. 
The meetings were held at 
the Aubervilliers municipal 
office, at the headquarters 
of the ‘Shoe Association’ 
and (more frequently) at the 
headquarters of a private 
company that is located in 
the middle of the wholesalers 
area. In the chapter I 
co-authored with Chuang 
Ya-han (2013) I focus on 
the problem of traffic in the 
neighbourhood and give a 
more detailed description 
of the relations between the 
municipal authorities and the 
Chinese wholesalers. 
4. With some exceptions 
leaving room for 
interpretation (which, as we 
will see, was widened in this 
case), the use of surveillance 
cameras to film public space 
is illegal.
5. It accounts for 
situations where one person 
is repeatedly subjected to 
contradictory injunctions by 
one or more other persons. 
The predominant setting 
in which the ‘double bind’ 
finds application is the 
parent-child relationship, 
and Bateson uses it to build 
a theory of schizophrenia. 
He notes however that it 
‘involves general principles 
which are important in all 
communication’ (2000: 222).
(www.huarenjie.com). It was formed after a series of vio-
lent robberies targeted Chinese wholesalers. Some (espe-
cially women) were robbed as they walked on the streets 
or sat in their cars, by men riding scooters; others were 
attacked as they closed their shops; a few were followed to 
their homes in the suburbs and attacked while they parked 
or were even robbed in their own houses.6  The violence 
appeared to have spread from the inner Paris neighbour-
hood of Belleville, where a similar increase in violent 
thefts targeted at the Chinese had led to a protest march in 
June 2010.7 The formation of UCAS in Aubervilliers was 
catalyzed by the collective mobilization of the Belleville 
Chinese community. Several Chinese merchant associa-
tions who had been among the organizers of the Belleville 
street march, were involved in the formation of UCAS. 
The secretary of UCAS was Mrs Lian who had long-
standing connections with the municipal office.8 She was 
a freelance consultant who had been employed by the 
municipal office to act as an intermediary with the Chinese 
wholesalers on previous occasions.9 The real leaders of 
UCAS were the presidents of the various associations 
that UCAS federates, and especially the president of the 
Association de la chaussure (Shoe Association). Mrs Lian 
organized meetings between the members of UCAS and 
representatives of the police or/and municipal authorities 
in the headquarters of this association.
UCAS took action on several levels. Its main task was 
to spread information among the wholesaler community 
on how to react in case of assault. UCAS transmitted and 
translated the statements issued by the police. It gave 
advice on how to avoid robberies (not carrying large 
amounts of cash money, etc.). It informed shopkeepers 
and their employees where to go and how to file a com-
plaint after a robbery. While fulfilling the task of transmit-
ting information, UCAS also took action at another level, 
namely that of lobbying the police and municipal authori-
ties in order to put the issue of ‘security’ in the wholesalers 
area onto the local public agenda. 
They had two main demands: first, they asked for an 
intensified police presence, and second, for the installation 
of cameras on the streets. This lobbying was sustained by 
the pressure put on the local authorities by a higher-level 
actor, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
France. After officials from the embassy stepped into the 
mayor of Aubervilliers’ office to ask him to safeguard the 
security of their citizens, two meetings were organized, 
on 23 December and 24 January, which brought together 
the Chinese ambassador (his representative at the second 
meeting), the mayor of Aubervilliers and the vice-president 
of Plaine commune (the higher level federation of munici-
palities of which Aubervilliers is part). The ambassador, 
who was present at the opening ceremony of the Chinese 
New Year festival along with the mayor of Aubervilliers, 
alluded to the issue of insecurity in the speech he gave.
‘Double bind’: French republicanism and ethnic 
particularism
Both the Chinese wholesalers and the police sent each 
other contradictory messages that simultaneously both 
rejected and embraced ethnic particularism. This ‘double 
bind’ was not restricted to discourse; the messages were 
also communicated via the kinds of action undertaken. 
On the one hand, the Chinese and the police appealed to 
French norms of good citizenship – i.e. being devoid of 
any ethnic particularism – and, on the other, they claimed 
or acknowledged that the Chinese wholesalers, targeted as 
an ethnic group, were entitled to protection.
The initiative of UCAS’s formation was to some extent 
viewed with suspicion by the police, who saw it as a kind 
of militia or attempt at self-protection. During the meet-
ings I attended, one representative of the police voiced his 
concerns explicitly, stating that the Chinese should not be 
tempted to take the law into their own hands. One officer, 
at the beginning of one of the first meetings, told the 
mainly young, French nationals of Chinese origin sitting 
in front of him, that ‘in this country, that kind of behav-
iour is not allowed’. He implied that France was a country 
where the state held a monopoly on the use of violence, 
in contrast to China. This was understandable however, 
considering that to legitimize the existence of UCAS, Mrs 
Lian had occasionally made references to the self-defence 
movements (ziweidui) formed by peasants in the Chinese 
countryside.10
The police seemed uncomfortable with the ethnic com-
munity base upon which UCAS relied, or at least they 
resorted rhetorically to the official republican denial of 
particularism and ‘communitarianism’ (communautar-
isme). Nevertheless, they did not deny that crimes were 
directed towards the Chinese as members of an ethnic 
minority; on the contrary, they took the ethnically targeted 
assaults very seriously.11 Moreover, the problem of security 
raised by the wholesalers was explained by the police in 
ethnic terms. One of the police officers explained at length 
that to prevent being targeted by robbers, the wholesalers 
had to change the image of the ‘Asian community’. ‘The 
“Asians” have a reputation for carrying loads of cash on 
them’, he said. ‘Before calling for more police etc., you 
should change this image of yourself’. 
Furthermore, the police stressed that a characteristic of 
the Chinese was that they did not file complaints; yet if 
no complaint was filed, there would be no record of any 
security problems in a particular area. The police insist-
ence on these two points shows that they attributed the 
cause of the problem to the wholesalers’ behaviour which 
was (presumed to be) determined by being part of a par-
ticular ethnic community. The fact that the police came to 
meetings organized by UCAS reflected their perception 
of the Chinese community as insular and difficult to com-
municate with. The police saw the UCAS initiative and 
the meetings they organized as an opportunity to establish 
contact with the Chinese.
The wholesalers’ discourse was also framed in ethnic 
terms, in that they called for solidarity among the Chinese 
community to remedy the situation. At the same time how-
ever, they were aware that the creation of UCAS could 
have a negative impact due to French suspicions towards 
communitarianism, especially if it began to resemble a 
self-defence ethnic organization. Therefore, they were 
careful to present their cause as one shared by all French 
citizens, and their action as within the limits of legality. 
This is shown in the foundational statement of UCAS as 
reported by an overseas Chinese journal:
Law enforcement by the police needs short-term improve-
ment in Paris as well as in many French cities. (…) Chinese 
merchants associations and enterprises have decided to make 
a ‘break through’, to break the vicious circle of “not being 
protected and not able to defend oneself”. They have sponta-
neously united to establish the Chinese merchants league for 
public security, with the goal of “maximizing” rights to protec-
tion within the limits of the law, by taking concrete steps, and 
obtaining the understanding of the local government, in order 
to contain crime, the goal is to unite for protection.12
Moreover, one of the main activities of UCAS at its 
inception was to disseminate the message issued by the 
police, as part of the solution to the problem of security 
that they were facing. As we have seen, this consisted in 
fostering individual behaviour that would potentially pre-
vent crimes and encouraging victims to report to the police. 
In short, they were informing members of the community 
how to act as good citizens while also trying to play down 
the suspicion that they were an ethnic self-defence organ-
ization. At the same time, however, the fact that UCAS 
Fig. 3. Logo of UCAS 
(Union des commerçants 
d’Aubervilliers pour la 
sécurité). 
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was acting as an intermediary between the police, the 
local authorities, and the Chinese wholesalers underlined 
its status as an ethnic Chinese community organization. 
UCAS translated their messages into Chinese and spread 
the word via community networks.
Contradictory messages were thus sent on both sides, 
and the police and the Chinese were caught in a mutual 
double bind. The Chinese were taking action as a group in 
order to provide for their own security, but at the same time 
they insisted that they were claiming rights to which all 
citizens were entitled. The police acknowledged the fact 
that a specific group was being targeted but constantly 
reminded them that they did not have the right to ensure 
their own protection.
Limited solutions in a context of reductions in 
public spending
I will now turn to the other possible actions that were 
discussed by the wholesalers and the police. Among the 
wholesalers who had settled earlier, some remembered 
that there used to be a police station in the neighbourhood. 
This station had been closed down as a consequence of the 
suppression of the police de proximité (proximity police) 
just after the arrival of the Sarkozy right-wing government 
in 2002.
There had been a partial step back to a form of ‘prox-
imity police’ under a disguised name, UTeQ (Unités 
Territoriales de Quartier, Territorial Neighbourhood 
Units), the first of which was put in place in Seine-Saint-
Denis. In August 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy’s minister of the 
interior, Brice Hortefeux, announced their replacement 
by specialized field brigades (Brigades Spécialisées de 
Terrain, BST), stating that ‘they will not be social workers’. 
This was meant to make it clear that these policemen 
would be repressive and not just there to relax. This fierce 
announcement masked the fact that instead of doubling the 
numbers of BST policemen, as had been planned and pro-
claimed by the Sarkozy government, their numbers were 
reduced.13  Aubervilliers has one BST located at the central 
police station.
As a result of the removal of the local station, if a 
wholesaler or one of his employees was assaulted and 
wanted to file a complaint, the only option was to go the 
central police station much further away, in downtown 
Aubervilliers. This, the wholesalers argued, was one of 
the reasons why they were reluctant to file complaints. 
Furthermore, they argued, the lack of a local police station 
and a police presence created a climate that was favour-
able to potential lawbreakers. The wholesalers, therefore, 
asked for increased patrolling. Police representatives 
responded that the rearrangement and redeployment of 
police forces did not mean that the police were not there. 
They explained that other neighbourhoods in Aubervilliers 
had much higher rates of criminality and needed police 
intervention far more than the wholesalers’ area, where the 
crime rate was officially very low because few complaints 
were filed. However, they also admitted that they did not 
have enough officers, due to cuts in public spending.
During one of the meetings, some Chinese wholesalers 
asked how they could help the police to enhance their pres-
ence and efficiency. One verbal exchange was remarkable 
in that it caused visible embarrassment on the side of the 
police. It was one of those instances Goffman (1974) 
would define as a breach in the normal interactive situation 
caused by a lapse, a faux pas, by one of the interactants. 
It occurred when the head of the Shoe Association, an 
older wholesaler, suddenly offered to pay for scooters. 
This, he added, would make it easier for the police to 
catch criminals. Not being fluent in French, he gestured to 
emphasize what he was saying. The other, younger whole-
salers who were sitting around the table supported his offer 
and explained that they also wanted to help the police and 
considered this their duty as citizens. 
The superintendent escaped the awkwardness of the 
situation by answering in general terms and in an official 
tone of voice that this would require the establishment of 
a ‘public/private partnership’ which would be difficult 
and slow to put in place. While he was saying this, Mrs 
Lian turned toward the wholesaler who had made the offer 
and whispered in Mandarin Chinese: ‘you should not say 
“give” (song), but “lease” (zu)’. She was aware that the 
offer did not conform to the expected norms of interaction 
with the police.14
The embarrassment of the police representatives was 
initiated by the blunt words: ‘we will pay’ as voiced by the 
wholesaler, but not only that. When the wholesaler told the 
police that he could pay for scooters, there was a subtle 
shift in the balance of the interaction. Until that moment 
it was the police who were in a position to tell the whole-
salers what they were doing wrong. The offer exposed the 
inability of the police to give the wholesalers what they 
wanted: more means to prevent crime. The whole situation 
Fig. 4. Showrooms displaying 
manufactured products 
imported from China to be 
sold wholesale.
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6. According to the police, 
the assaults were perpetrated 
by gangs of youth from 
the nearby poor immigrant 
neighbourhoods.
7. This event had been 
given much public attention 
in the French media, as it 
was the first time that a street 
march was organized by an 
ethnic community, and, more 
remarkably, a community 
that has a reputation for being 
low-profile and trouble-free. 
8. Her name has been 
changed.
9. She is not a wholesaler, 
and she does not originate 
from Wenzhou as almost 
all most wholesalers do (cf. 
note 1).
10. Fieldnotes, UCAS 
meeting, 7 April 2011.
11. The superintendent 
in charge of the ‘thefts and 
violence group’ (Groupe 
Vols Violences) at the 
commissariat of Aubervilliers 
stated that ‘in France the 
Chinese community is very 
much targeted, that means 
that there are neighbourhoods 
where they are targeted by 
delinquents’. He added ‘there 
are delinquents that specialize 
in Chinese’. 
12. http://voice.oushinet.
com/172-2963-104194.aspx, 
7 January 2011 (translation 
is mine). The mention of 
‘within the limits of the law’ 
alluded to the event that 
had triggered the Belleville 
street demonstration in 
June 2010: the arrest of a 
Chinese restaurant owner 
who had shot an assailant 
who attempted to rob money 
during a Chinese wedding 
(the restaurant owner had 
turned himself in, but was 
celebrated on internet forums 
as the hero of the Chinese 
community). Moreover, the 
street march itself had ended 
up in looting on the streets of 
Belleville, hence the attention 
it had been given by the 
media.
13. Hortefeux made this 
statement two weeks after 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s infamous 
speech in Grenoble on 30 
July, who declared a ‘national 
war on delinquency’ and in 
particular, the withdrawal of 
French nationality for certain 
crimes and offenses.
14. Field notes, UCAS 
meeting, 7 April 2011.
15. The cameras had cost 
96,000 euros. The money had 
been collected by voluntary 
contributions from the 
wholesalers; most (around 
300 of them) had given 200 
euros, and a dozen had given 
up to 3,000.
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16. Private individuals 
have to make a special 
request at the prefecture to 
be authorized to film within 
places open to the public 
such as restaurants and shops. 
In both cases, it is required 
that the public be informed 
of the presence of cameras. 
No authorization was needed 
for an installation in private 
places or offices that are 
closed to the public.
17. (Elles permettaient 
de confier à des personnes 
privées la surveillance 
générale de la voie publique). 
The Constitutional Council 
censored 13 out of 142 
dispositions of the law 
project, including one that 
enlarged the powers of 
municipal police officers, 
authorizing them to control 
IDs, and another that 
extended the principle of 
‘minimal sentences’ to 
minors. Law number n° 2011-
267, or LOPPSI law was 
promulgated on 14 March 
2011. 
18. ICADE, the company 
that owns many of the 
warehouses rented by the 
Chinese wholesalers, had 
already installed a network of 
cameras on the streets that run 
between the buildings. This 
is considered to be private 
space, since it lies inside the 
business parks. The manager 
wanted to know whether they 
could install cameras that 
would film the entrance to the 
parks, and thus the street – 
public space.
19. Fieldnotes, lunch 
meeting at a private company 
in the wholesalers area, 21 
June 2012.
20. Although this 
nomination remains 
in conformity with the 
republican setting, the 
nomination of a police 
officer is shocking, for its 
connotation is that of a regime 
of police administration 
rather than a rule of law; the 
two powers are normally 
clearly separated and, in a 
democracy such as France, 
the administrative power of 
the police is subordinated to 
the rule of law.
21. Interview conducted 
by Chuang Ya-han, 5 
March 2012, personal 
communication. 
was framed by the larger problem raised by this offer of 
private sponsorship, namely that law enforcement and the 
security of citizens are the prerogative of the state, and are 
a public matter.
According to Bateson, ‘double-binding is a type of 
struggle and commonly one or the other has the upper hand’ 
(2000: 237). In this particular struggle over how security 
should be implemented, the police, as a law enforcement 
authority, in theory should have had the upper hand. The 
scene I have just described however reveals that this was 
not the case. The contradictory messages of the police can 
be accounted for by the fact that they had limited room to 
manoeuvre. They could not meet the demands for intensi-
fied patrolling or the re-establishment of proximity police 
because of the reduction of public spending; they could nei-
ther accept the Chinese offer nor let them set up a militia, 
since this would imply a privatization of law enforcement. 
Surveillance cameras, in this immediate context, therefore 
appeared as the most available and viable option.
Surveillance cameras
Surveillance cameras were the most immediate response 
the wholesalers could make to the problem they were 
facing, and one that they could provide for themselves 
without having to rely on the police. By June 2011, they 
had set up a network of 41 cameras, several of which were 
filming the street.15
In the meantime, the possibility of installing a 
public, municipal network of cameras in the streets of 
Aubervilliers were being examined by the authorities. 
The responsibilities and powers of French municipali-
ties in matters of security have been increased in the past 
decade. Mayors have been granted a central role in the 
field of prevention since the 2007 law on the prevention of 
delinquency, and in October 2007 a ‘videoprotection plan’ 
has been launched by the Ministry of the Interior, along 
with a ‘Fund for the Prevention of Delinquency’ (Fonds 
Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance, FIPD) 
that finances the installation of municipal surveillance sys-
tems and their connection to police stations. Municipalities 
are thus encouraged to implement their own systems of 
surveillance. This has given rise to debates on these issues 
in a large number of French cities over the past few years.
While awaiting the outcome of the specially appointed 
commission’s conclusions, the mayor of Aubervilliers was 
counting on the passing of the new law on video protection 
in early 2011; he saw therein the most ready response to 
the wholesalers’ demands. 
This law, named LOPPSI (Orientation and program-
ming law for the performance of interior security/Loi 
d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance 
de la sécurité intérieure) was expected to expand the scope 
of the use of ‘video protection’ by private individuals. The 
existing legislation allowed public places to be filmed 
only by public authorities; private persons could film pri-
vate places but were not allowed to film public space (la 
voie publique).16 Article 18 of the LOPPSI law, if adopted, 
would allow private individuals to place cameras ‘in the 
surroundings of (aux abords de, a very vague term) build-
ings’ and to film public space. 
However, on 10 March 2011, the French Constitutional 
Council censored several articles of this law, including 
article 18, declaring it unconstitutional on the grounds that 
it would amount to ‘entrusting the task of general surveil-
lance of public space (voie publique) to private persons’17 
and thereby breach the constitutional principle according 
to which, security in the public space should be enforced by 
what in French is called the ‘public force’ (force publique).
Therefore, this clause was not inscribed in the final ver-
sion of the law. Apparently, however, the local actors in 
Aubervilliers had held such an expectation that the change 
in legislation would go through, that they either did not 
take in this information or simply ignored it. The whole-
salers went on with their project to film the street; the 
police turned a blind eye to it. Actually, they even con-
gratulated the wholesalers on their purchases.
During a later meeting in June 2012, over lunch, the 
superintendent of Aubervilliers told me that he had seen 
the ‘surveillance system’ and that the images were being 
used by the police. One of the ICADE managers present 
asked the superintendent whether he would be allowed 
to film the street like the Chinese.18 The superintendent 
answered that it was tolerated, and that the department 
that delivered clearances was rather easy-going on this 
matter.19 Any installation of a protection system using 
video to film public space in places such as banks, air-
ports or restaurants, requires prior authorization by the 
prefect, the representative of the state at the local level of 
the department. Exceptions can thus be made for closed, 
privately owned places frequented by the public, but not 
for the street as public space (voie publique). 
Since article 18 of the Loppsi law has been censored, the 
use of surveillance cameras to film people in the street (by 
anyone other than the public authorities) remains illegal. 
The superintendent’s remark on the leniency of the depart-
mental direction showed he knew the law but considered 
Fig. 5. Police patrolling 
during the Chinese New Year 
festival, February 2011.
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that there was nonetheless some latitude for interpretation. 
I would suggest that this margin for interpretation may be 
increased in a context where a kind of ‘regime of excep-
tion’ has been put in place, such as in the Seine-Saint-
Denis department. The highly mediatized appointment 
of its new prefect, Christian Lambert, in May 2010, by 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, was considered provocative, 
since he was not chosen from among the usual state civil 
servants, but was a police officer. This appointment was 
intended to symbolize the war on delinquency declared by 
Sarkozy.20
The very situation in which this dialogue took place 
shows how such more or less formal gatherings – here, a 
rather informal one, during lunch, where the police super-
intendent might be less expected to speak as a superinten-
dent – foster the dissemination of information between the 
lines, on what is tolerated and what is not.
Conclusion
Although what I have detailed above may seem to indicate 
a kind of collusion between the police and the wholesalers 
in Aubervilliers, resulting in a collaboration over the use 
of the images filmed by the wholesalers’ cameras, this was 
not exactly the case. Although there was a tacit agreement, 
there was no active cooperation.
Video surveillance is a tool that lends itself very well to 
the idea that surveillance can be carried out without human 
presence. But when it is installed, the question remains of 
who will keep watch. The wholesalers, although they had 
pooled their money to buy expensive surveillance mate-
rial, were not willing to pay a proper salary and training 
for someone to monitor the screens and pass on informa-
tion to the police. Instead, two underpaid and undeclared 
employees did the job for a few months and were eventu-
ally fired. The police expressed frustration at the way the 
wholesalers managed their surveillance system. A police 
sergeant stated that the Chinese tended to go down to the 
street to chase thieves as soon as they saw something hap-
pening on the screen, thereby suggesting that they were 
using these cameras to enforce security for themselves. He 
added that the Chinese had a radically different way of 
thinking about those things.21
After more than two years of talks between the police 
and the Chinese wholesalers, the misunderstandings – or 
rather, the mutual ‘double bind’ – remained unresolved. 
The wholesalers managed to organize collectively by 
appealing to ethnic solidarity. At the same time, they 
considered that security and law enforcement was a 
public matter that should be accomplished by the police 
and required a stronger police presence. The police and 
municipal authorities, although they were wary of the 
ethnic framework and self-defence connotation of UCAS, 
were conscious of their lack of resources and anxious to 
keep the wholesale business in Aubervilliers. Therefore, 
they implicitly encouraged the formation of UCAS and 
the actions undertaken. The double bind is, according to 
Bateson, a type of struggle. In this situation the struggle 
was between two parties who found themselves taking 
actions that stretched the limits of legality while, at the 
same time, denying that this was the case.
The French case does not fit David Garland’s (1996) 
observations on the British state’s qualification of its own 
claim to be the primary provider of security and crime 
control; the French state, as the Constitutional Council’s 
decision shows, still claims absolute monopoly on the use 
of force. And yet, because the state seeks to reduce costs, 
it is unable to deliver the levels of crime control that citi-
zens expect. Therefore, what is at stake here is a kind of 
nested double bind: as a result of the state’s contradictory 
messages, the police force has to respect the principle of 
the monopoly on the use of force, but faced with budgetary 
reductions, it is inclined to let citizens who have the means 
to do so, ensure their own protection.
Video surveillance appears to be a battleground where 
the boundaries between the public and the private are 
negotiated in the context of a retreating state. Although 
today French law still draws a clear distinction between 
public and private space in matters of surveillance, in the 
field, actors are ignoring this distinction while pretending 
they are not, and wishing they need not. In this sense the 
case examined here is a typical example of the double bind 
situation sketched by Bateson.
The compromise between the police and the wholesalers 
was a local response to neoliberal policies that encourage 
such conciliations by reducing other options, such as an 
increase in the number of police officers and patrols. In 
this case, powerful economic actors who have the means 
to lobby the public authorities have been tacitly allowed 
to use video surveillance in public space for their self-pro-
tection. This reveals the conflicting tendencies in today’s 
neoliberal context between the demand for public inter-
vention and the state on the one hand, and the privatiza-
tion of state attributions on the other. The neoliberal policy 
reforms that have led to budget cuts in public spending and 
the privatization of public services results in a de facto pri-
vatization of the enforcement of public security.  l
Fig. 6. The Chinese 
ambassador, with the mayor 
of Aubervilliers (to his left) at 
the opening ceremony of the 
Chinese New Year festival,  
3 February 2011.
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